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Abstract — Data Warehouse (DWH) provides storage for huge amounts of historical data from heterogeneous
operational sources in the form of multidimensional views, thus supplying sensitive and useful information which
help decision-makers to improve the organization’s business processes. A data warehouse environment must ensure
that data collected and stored in one big repository are not vulnerable. A review of security approaches specifically for
data warehouse environment and issues concerning each type of security approach have been provided in this paper.
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Confidentiality
emphasizes
protection
of
information from unauthorized disclosure, either by
indirect logical inference or by direct retrieval [3].
Integrity involves data protection from accidental or
malicious changes such as false data insertion,
contamination, or destruction. Availability ensures that
data are accessible to all authorized users at any time.
In the past, many data security solutions for databases
have been proposed.
Although available solutions have been proven to be
scientifically effective, they are infeasible or at least
inefficient for a DWH environment because this
environment requires specific performance. Most of
today’s DWH security solutions lack effective security
procedures to protect the data accessed through them.
Existing security methods can be best for restricting
security breaches, but cannot completely eliminate the
risk.
In this paper, we present a survey of the security
approaches available for DWHs and the issues
concerning each type of security approach. The
remainder of the paper is organized into two sections.
In Section 2, various existing data security solutions for
DWHs are presented, and specific issues in the DWH
environment are discussed. Finally, Section 3 concludes
the paper and highlights future research directions.

1 Introduction
In today’s competitive business environment,
organizations need to collaborate with each other and
track their performance for market trend analysis. With
the help of advances in computer and network
technology, organizations stores, collect, and analyze
vast amounts of data efficiently and quickly. Data are
analyzed by the organization not only for market trend
identification, but also to examine the effectiveness of
their activities and to make decisions that affect their
bottom line. Therefore, data management has become
crucial because organizations not only need to store and
retrieve data, but also need to derive meaningful
information from it. As a consequence, organizations
have come to depend more on knowledge management
technologies such as interoperable knowledge
management, knowledge repositories, and data
warehouses (DWH).
A data warehouse may contain massive amounts of
organizational data such as financial information, credit
card numbers, organization trade secrets, and personal
data, thus they are vulnerable to cyber attack [1]. A
DWH must ensure that sensitive data does not fall into
the wrong hands when data are consolidated into one
big repository and become an easy target for malicious
outside or inside attackers. Many published security
statistics show that the number of attacks on data is
increasing continuously [2]. Data security focusses
mainly on three issues: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, these concepts are also know by the
acronym CIA.
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2. Security Approaches for DWH
A DWH is an integral part of an organization and
empowers its users by enabling them to retrieve
information about the business process as a whole.
According to Devbandu [4], security is an important
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requirement for DWH development, starting from
requirements and continuing through implementation
and maintenance. Security solutions for on-line
transactional processing (OLTP) systems cannot be
appropriate for DWHs because in OLTP, security
controls are applied on rows, columns, or tables, while
DWHs need to be accessed by different numbers of
users for different content because multidimensionality
is a basic principle of a DWH [1, 5].
Data extraction, transformation, cleaning, and
preparation have all been done before the data are
loaded into the DWH. Security concerns must be
addressed at all layers of a DWH system. Moreover,
DWH security cannot be ensured unless the security of
the underlying operating system and the network have
been addressed [6]. Various security solutions have
been proposed in the DWH literature and are described
below, categorized according to how they address basic
security concerns such as CIA.

2.1
DWH
Security
Confidentiality Issues

Approaches

2.2 DWH Security Approaches for Integrity
Integrity involves data protection from accidental or
malicious changes such as false data insertion,
contamination, or destruction. The disadvantage of
access-control mechanisms is that they do not capture
inferences on data in the case of an aggregated OLAP
query. Inferences on data lead to the integrity issue. For
more than thirty years, inference-control approaches
have been studied in statistical and census databases [7,
8, 9]. The proposed approaches can be categorized into
restriction-based and perturbation-based techniques.
Restriction-based inference control techniques simply
deny unsafe queries to prevent malicious inference.
Perturbation techniques add noise to data, swap data, or
modify the original data and can also apply data
modification to each query dynamically. The
approaches presented to solve the integrity issue can be
classified further as described below.
2.2.1 Restriction-based approaches
In restriction-based inference-control techniques, the
safety of a query is determined based on the maximum
number of values aggregated by dissimilar queries [8],
the minimum number of values aggregated by a query
[10], and the highest rank of the matrix expressing
answered queries [11].
Micro-aggregation and partitioning considers
specific type of aggregations. In partitioning methods, a
partition is defined on sensitive data, and a restriction is
applied on a complete block of a partition for aggregate
queries [12, 13]. Micro-aggregation also replaces
cluster averages with their sensitive values [14]. Both
methods are not based on dimensional hierarchies and
therefore may contain meaningless blocks that are not
useful for users.

for

Confidentiality emphasizes protection of information
from unauthorized disclosure, either by indirect logical
inference or by direct retrieval [3]. In order to address
DWH confidentiality concerns, many approaches have
been proposed dealing with access control. Accesscontrol mechanisms involve controlling both invocation
and administration of the DWH and the source
databases. Authentication and audit mechanisms also
fall under access control and must be installed in a
DWH environment.
Conventionally, DWHs have been accessed by highlevel users such as business analysts and executive
management. Therefore, critical access-control issues
also arise at the front end of a DWH. Most DWH or
OLAP vendors assume that there is no need to provide
fine-grained access-control support for a DWH front
end because it hinders discovery of analytical
information. However, this assumption is not
appropriate because many users can access analytical
tools to query the DWH. Front-end DWH applications
can provide both static and dynamic reporting.
Imposing access control on static reports is not a
problem because it can be defined on a report basis. For
dynamic reporting like data-mining queries, it is
difficult to provide appropriate access-control policies.
This leads to the problem of data inference; for
example, a user may not be authorized to obtain
particular information, but may retrieve it through an
aggregated query.
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2.2.2 Combined Access- and Inference-Control
Approaches
In order to remove security threats, access control and
inference control together can provide a good solution.
Ensuring security should not affect the usefulness of
DWH and OLAP systems. Wand & Jajodia [15]
proposed a three-tier security architecture for a DWH.
Usually, two tiers can be found in statistical databases,
such as sensitive data and aggregation queries. This
two-tier architecture has some inherent drawbacks:
inference checking during run-time query processing
may result in unacceptable delays, and also under this
two-tier architecture, inference-control techniques
cannot benefit from the special characteristics of
OLAP. To overcome these drawbacks, the research has
defined a three-tier architecture to provide access
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control between the first and second tiers and inference
control between the second and third tiers.
The basic lattice-based inference method [16] can be
used and implemented on the three-tier inferencecontrol model. The first methodology used existing
inference-control methods for statistical databases,
whereas the second methodology was designed to
remove the limitations of existing inference-control
methods. The work claims that both methods could be
applied on the basis of a three-tier inference control
architecture that is more appropriate for DWH and
OLAP systems specifically.

numerical values. The proposed approach was based on
mathematical modulus operators such as division,
remainder, and two simple arithmetic operations, which
can be used without changing DBMS source code and
user applications. They claimed that the proposed
formula required low computational effort and that as a
result, query response-time overheads became
relatively small while still providing an appropriate
security level.

2.3 DWH Security
Availability Issues

for

the

Data availability is of utmost importance in any DWH
system. This involves data recovery from real-time
corruption or incorrect data modification and
continuous 24/7 user access. Data replication is
performed to be able to restore damaged data using
many proposed solutions. In this way, database
downtime because of maintenance interventions can
also be avoided, and query-processing efforts can be
divided, avoiding data-access hotspots. Well-known
RAID architectures can be used for mirroring data [22,
23] on systems where centralized servers contain the
database. However, organizations have been
implementing their DWHs in low-cost machines for
cost-optimization purposes. RAID technology is not
suitable for this kind of situation because typically only
one disk drive is present.
In today’s market, commercial solutions for the
DWH data-availability issue are available, such as
Oracle RAC [24] and Aster Data [25]. Hamming codes
provide another approach to recover corrupted data
using error-correction codes. The proposed data-storage
system makes it possible to recover corrupted data
blocks by using error-correcting codes, remapping bad
blocks, and replicating blocks [26, 27]. Marsh &
Schneider [28] proposed a technique for distributed
storage used the same features as described earlier plus
encryption methods. Other researchers [29, 30, 31, 32,
33] have also proposed architecture assessment and
self-healing methods to address the availability issue.
Recently, Darwish et al. [34] have establish cloudbased protocols to defend against denial-of-services
attacks.

2.2.3 Modelling-based Approaches to DWH Security
Triki et al. [17] proposed approach provides semiautomatic inference detection at the DWH design level.
The approach presented consists of three phases. The
first phase identifies sensitive data from DWH
schemata with the collaboration of security designers
and experts in the field. In the second phase, an
inference graph based on a class diagram is constructed
to detect elements which may cause inferences in
future. The security designer also distinguishes between
elements leading to precise and partial inferences.
Precise inference means that exact information is
disclosed, whereas partial inference leads only to partial
disclosure of information.
The inference graph consists of a set of nodes
representing the data. Then nodes are connected to each
other by oriented arcs representing the direction of
inference and its type (partial or precise). In the third
phase, DWH schemata are enriched automatically by
UML annotations which flag the elements that may
lead to both types of inferences. The work claimed that
their approach had two advantages: independence of
the data domain, and use of available data to detect
inferences.
2.2.4 Data Masking and Perturbation-Based
Security Approaches
Data disclosure can be easily avoided by data-masking
approaches. Using data masking, original data values
can be replaced or changed. Currently, the best
practices for data masking are used by Oracle in their
DBMS [18]. In data masking, encryption is an
advanced form of enforcing privacy. Oracle has also
developed Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) in the
10g and 11g versions of its DBMS. TDE incorporates
the well-known AES and 3DES encryption algorithms
[19, 20].
Santos et al. [21] proposed a data-masking
technique for data warehouses consisting only of
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Approaches

3 Discussion
A literature review of the various approaches to DWH
security has been presented above. A DWH needs
powerful security features in addition to its normal
functionalities. The primary security requirements are
summarized by the Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability (CIA) acronym. A full set of security
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features can be defined under these three basic
properties, such as access control, inference control,
non-repudiation, authentication, authorization, and
availability. The best security model is one that
provides end-to-end security in all phases of DWH,
starting from modelling and continuing through
implementation and maintenance. Moreover, the
security model must address the three basic CIA
security requirements. Some of these approaches
consider security requirement confidentiality.
Security approaches which discussed integrity issues
were further classified by how they address this type of
security concern. Some of the approaches also tried to
address the issue of DWH availability. In short, all the
proposed approaches addressed only some aspects of
security, and a DWH security model are needed that
covers all the security requirements and also help in
developing a secure DWH. The identified issues with
security approaches in DWHs are listed below:

h) A model is needed that helps to identify security
requirements automatically throughout the DWH
life cycle and makes it possible to provide proper
authentication.
None of the existing approaches addressed this
issue. The proper identification of security policies
is a highly critical starting point in implementing
security in a DWH.
i) Most of the approaches used standard encryption
methods and tried to provide strong data privacy.
However, use of this type of encryption method
makes them inefficient for DWH use. Encryption
algorithms like AES and 3DES require large
computational effort and have a huge impact on
performance. A technique is therefore needed that
provides strong data privacy with less computational
effort and also maintains high performance, which is
the basic requirement of DWH use.
In order to provide DWH security, the real goal is to
protect data Security and to preserve an appropriate
level of privacy requirements must be considered in all
layers of the system involved. No efforts have been
made until now to integrate security into the complete
DWH development cycle. Some approaches consider
security requirements in the early stages of the DWH
development life cycle. More efforts have been put in
logical modelling of DWH security requirements, but
they have not provided any tool support for
implementing the modelled security requirements
automatically in the target DWH system. A holistic
approach of security throughout the software life cycle
[35], may also benefit from a neuro-fuzzy framework
[36, 37] - like it has been applied to other application
domains.

a) Proper identification of security policies is a highly
critical starting point in implementing security in a
DWH.
b) Most of the approaches used standard encryption
methods and tried to provide strong data privacy.
However, use of this type of encryption method
makes them inefficient for DWH use. Encryption
algorithms like AES and 3DES require large
computational effort and have a huge impact on
performance. A technique is therefore needed that
provides strong data privacy with less computational
effort and also maintains high performance, which is
the basic requirement of DWH use.
c) A method is also needed that specifically addresses
the DWH availability issue. It will improve existing
data-recovery methods to repair or restore corrupted
data quickly, efficiently, and effectively.
d) Evaluation methods for DWH security are also
needed. None of the approaches examined addresses
the issue of how one can assess the maturity level of
security in a DWH.
e) Confidentiality, data integrity, and availability are
also basic requirements for DWH security. A
combination of the approaches discussed above
could be helpful in providing a solution to this
problem.
f) Most of the approaches are domain-dependent, not
generic, or are somehow constraints-based.
g) A DWH security maintenance mechanism is needed
that takes specific security requirements into
consideration and applies them appropriately.
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4. Conclusion
This study has provided a literature review of existing
DWH security solutions, discussing their issues and
their impact on DWH scalability and performance
requirements. It has become apparent that the proposed
solutions are infeasible or inefficient for use in DWH
environments. A DWH requires specific functionality
with tight scalability and performance requirements. A
complete solution is therefore needed that makes it
possible to address these directives. DWH security is an
active research relevance to any industrial project.
Further research in DWH security is needed to address
the issues discussed above because many more aspects
remain to be considered, and there many open
questions to be answered.
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